Bush Looked for Non-WMD Reasons for War, Memo Says
Global Security Newswire
U.S. President George W. Bush in January 2003 mentioned several options for forcing a war with Iraq in the absence of weapons of mass destruction, including assassinating Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, March 22).
Bush told British Prime Minister Tony Blair during a Jan. 31 meeting that his plans for invasion would not be stopped by lack of a second U.N. resolution on Iraq or inspectors' inability to find unconventional weapons in the country, according to a memo by David Manning, who was then Blair's chief foreign policy adviser.
"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," according to the memo on the discussion by the two leaders and six leading aides.
"The start date for the military campaign was not penciled in for 10 March," Manning wrote. "That was when the bombing would begin."
The meeting occurred five days before then-Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed the U.N. Security Council with evidence of Iraq's alleged WMD programs. No unconventional weapons have been found since the fall of the Hussein regime.
Blair and Bush noted at the meeting that international inspectors had not found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Times reported. Bush mentioned several possible plans for leading Iraq into war, according to the memo.
"The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colors," the memo states. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."
Bush also said the "U.S. might be able to bring out a defector who would give a public presentation about Saddam's WMD."
Another option would be to assassinate Hussein, Bush is noted as saying in the memo.
The British press last month reported on Bush's proposals. It is not clear in the memo whether the president was speaking in an off-hand fashion, or if the proposals were included in a White House plan, according to the Times. The memo does not indicate how Blair reacted to the potential assassination of Hussein.
National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones said that Bush's conversation with Blair did not contradict his public statements in the buildup to the March 2003 invasion.
"While the use of force was a last option, we recognized that it might be necessary and were planning accordingly," he said.
"Saddam Hussein was given every opportunity to comply, but he chose continued defiance, even after being given one final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. Our public and private comments are fully consistent" (Don Van Natta Jr., New York Times, March 27).
High-level prewar Iraqi officials doubted whether Baghdad had weapons of mass destruction even as Hussein played up their existence in hopes of preventing an attack by Israel, United Press International reported Saturday.
Hussein adviser Ali Hassan al-Majid - also known as "Chemical Ali" - "was convinced Iraq no longer possessed WMD, but claims many within the ruling circle always believed they did," according to a report by the Iraqi Perspectives Project at the U.S. Joint Forces Command.
The CIA belief in Iraqi unconventional weapons persuaded one official in Baghdad that they existed, UPI reported.
By late 2002, Hussein was attempting to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors and to eliminate WMD remnants, the report states. However, the report also says there is support for U.S. weapons inspectors' postwar conclusion that Hussein planned to reconstitute chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs once he was freed from economic sanctions, UPI reported (Pamela Hess, United Press International, March 25).
U.S. President George W. Bush in January 2003 mentioned several options for forcing a war with Iraq in the absence of weapons of mass destruction, including assassinating Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, March 22).
Bush told British Prime Minister Tony Blair during a Jan. 31 meeting that his plans for invasion would not be stopped by lack of a second U.N. resolution on Iraq or inspectors' inability to find unconventional weapons in the country, according to a memo by David Manning, who was then Blair's chief foreign policy adviser.
"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," according to the memo on the discussion by the two leaders and six leading aides.
"The start date for the military campaign was not penciled in for 10 March," Manning wrote. "That was when the bombing would begin."
The meeting occurred five days before then-Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed the U.N. Security Council with evidence of Iraq's alleged WMD programs. No unconventional weapons have been found since the fall of the Hussein regime.
Blair and Bush noted at the meeting that international inspectors had not found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Times reported. Bush mentioned several possible plans for leading Iraq into war, according to the memo.
"The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colors," the memo states. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."
Bush also said the "U.S. might be able to bring out a defector who would give a public presentation about Saddam's WMD."
Another option would be to assassinate Hussein, Bush is noted as saying in the memo.
The British press last month reported on Bush's proposals. It is not clear in the memo whether the president was speaking in an off-hand fashion, or if the proposals were included in a White House plan, according to the Times. The memo does not indicate how Blair reacted to the potential assassination of Hussein.
National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones said that Bush's conversation with Blair did not contradict his public statements in the buildup to the March 2003 invasion.
"While the use of force was a last option, we recognized that it might be necessary and were planning accordingly," he said.
"Saddam Hussein was given every opportunity to comply, but he chose continued defiance, even after being given one final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. Our public and private comments are fully consistent" (Don Van Natta Jr., New York Times, March 27).
High-level prewar Iraqi officials doubted whether Baghdad had weapons of mass destruction even as Hussein played up their existence in hopes of preventing an attack by Israel, United Press International reported Saturday.
Hussein adviser Ali Hassan al-Majid - also known as "Chemical Ali" - "was convinced Iraq no longer possessed WMD, but claims many within the ruling circle always believed they did," according to a report by the Iraqi Perspectives Project at the U.S. Joint Forces Command.
The CIA belief in Iraqi unconventional weapons persuaded one official in Baghdad that they existed, UPI reported.
By late 2002, Hussein was attempting to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors and to eliminate WMD remnants, the report states. However, the report also says there is support for U.S. weapons inspectors' postwar conclusion that Hussein planned to reconstitute chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs once he was freed from economic sanctions, UPI reported (Pamela Hess, United Press International, March 25).
