Scientific Codes of Conduct Inevitable, Experts Say
By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire
ST. LOUIS, Mo. - Codes of conduct that scientists would follow to prevent their research from laying the groundwork for acts of bioterrorism are necessary and ultimately inevitable, experts said last week (see GSN, Sept. 5, 2003).
Professional organizations such as the American Society for Microbiology have already developed ethics principles for their members, while entities in the United States and abroad are preparing guidelines that could be disseminated more broadly. The nations of the Biological Weapons Convention are set to consider the matter at their review conference later this year in Geneva.
However, the issue is by no means settled. Scientists continue to debate the value of a code and governments are considering whether they want an international protocol or if it should be handled individually by nations.
Beyond that is making sure the guidelines would be adhered to where they matter - in the laboratory.
"I think there are going to be codes. I'm not sure that the scientists are going to be aware of them," Gigi Kwik Gronvall, an associate with the University of Pittsburgh Center for Biosecurity, said Saturday during the 2006 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Research on dangerous pathogens that once might not have faced significant scrutiny now raises red flags for the scientific community and the media in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks and the subsequent anthrax mailings. Much attention has been paid in recent years to several projects, including a 2002 paper on recreating the polio virus and a 2005 article on contaminating milk with botulinum.
The scientific community has responded with several proposals to concerns that its work could assist state or terrorist biological weapons efforts. A U.S. National Academy of Sciences committee in 2003 recommended a nationwide screening system for potentially sensitive biological research (see GSN. Oct. 8, 2003). Editors at major scientific journals that year also called for restraint in publishing articles that might aid would-be bioterrorists (see GSN, Feb. 19, 2003).
Codes of conduct are needed "to prevent the life sciences from becoming the death sciences through bioterrorism or biowarfare," said Ronald Atlas, co-director of the Center for Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism at the University of Louisville in Kentucky.
"We need to embrace the development of codes. What we really need to do is create a culture of responsibility," Atlas said Saturday during a panel discussion at the conference.
Atlas and Margaret Somerville, a professor of law and medicine at McGill University in Montreal, developed a prototype code that calls on scientists to "work to ensure that their discoveries and knowledge first do no harm." That means complying with the Biological Weapons Convention and avoiding any research that is clearly intended or is highly likely to facilitate use of biological weapons.
The nine-point plan also calls for safety and ethics reviews of research and encourages scientists to call public attention to research that could be related to biological weapons.
Consideration of codes is occurring within governments and organizations around the world, panel speakers said. The International Red Cross in 2004 issued its own set of principles for the life sciences (see GSN, Nov. 12, 2004). The InterAcademy Panel on International Issues last year issued a statement of principles - endorsed by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and dozens of other state scientific academies - that should be considered when preparing ethics policies.
"I would imagine all of these groups are hoping to influence the broader life sciences community," panel speaker Mark Nance, a member of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, said in an interview.
The board was established in 2004 to prepare strategies for oversight of federally funded or operated dual-use research that could be used against the country. One of its five working groups is developing a code of conduct that could be taken up by U.S. research institutions, said Nance, a senior counsel at GE Healthcare Biosciences.
The group is seeking input from life science professionals, and next month plans to conduct focus groups to obtain feedback on concepts that could be used in a code.
Group members have not published a schedule for completion of their work - which will rely on the results of another group developing a definition of dual-use research - and Nance said it was premature to discuss how the document might be implemented.
He said the group is monitoring similar international and domestic efforts for ideas that could strengthen its work.
In December, Biological Weapons Convention states approved a report encouraging scientists to develop ethics codes (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2005). An earlier version of the text had called on governments to promote such guidelines.
Atlas said he does not expect the nations at the treaty review conference beginning in November to approve an actual code of conduct that BWC members could use. China and other nations prefer to see the matter handled by each nation. More likely is that the members would approve a statement of support for codes, he said.
Critics say codes would restrict scientists' work while doing little to prevent an actual act of bioterrorism. They argue that their work is inherently neutral, while "bad guys are going to do bad things [and] you can't stop them," Atlas said.
Panel members acknowledged that codes would not prevent terrorists from carrying out biological attacks, but said they could raise awareness on sound practices to keep their research from supporting such an act.
They stressed that codes should allow for the greatest possible freedom for research and publication. Actual restrictions should only come into play if there is a "clear and imminent danger" that a project could promote bioterrorism, Atlas said.
Any code must avoid instituting a "top-down" framework, meaning allowing the government to decide what work can or cannot be done, Gronvall said. It is impossible to clearly define what constitutes dangerous research, and the biosciences are too widespread globally, diverse and fragmented to be controlled.
It is up to the research institutions and the scientists themselves to ensure they followed any codes, panel speakers said. Scientists are best positioned to see and address a potential risk, Gronvall said.
That strategy entails additional responsibility. Gronvall said scientists must be aware that work that does not appear related to weaponizable pathogens - for example, an aerosolized measles vaccine - could aid weapons programs. Professors must ensure their students are familiar with the Biological Weapons Convention and the obligations established by a code.
Failure to recognize the power of their work could have serious repercussions for science, Gronvall said. An act of terrorism that is linked to a study could lead to governmental restrictions on research that could undermine efforts to stem a health crisis such as SARS, she said.
Ethical violations could also hurt the scientists themselves. The American Society for Microbiology code details a review process that could lead to expulsion of members found to have violated the policy. Scientists seen as violating codes could find it difficult to work within the research community, Gronvall said.
She said in an interview that codes should be one part of an awareness campaign that includes discussion and development of more concrete biosafety policies.
Biosecurity can be taught in scientific training alongside biosafety rules such as wearing gloves and goggles, Gretchen Lorenzi, an analyst with the FBI WMD Countermeasures Unit, said during the panel discussion.
When collaborating or sharing research, asking a few questions will help scientists "sleep at night easily," Lorenzi said. Do you know where the information is going? Has the recipient been published in a related field? Was the person referred by someone known to you?
"The most valuable contribution to biosecurity is actually awareness," Lorenzi said.
Global Security Newswire
ST. LOUIS, Mo. - Codes of conduct that scientists would follow to prevent their research from laying the groundwork for acts of bioterrorism are necessary and ultimately inevitable, experts said last week (see GSN, Sept. 5, 2003).
Professional organizations such as the American Society for Microbiology have already developed ethics principles for their members, while entities in the United States and abroad are preparing guidelines that could be disseminated more broadly. The nations of the Biological Weapons Convention are set to consider the matter at their review conference later this year in Geneva.
However, the issue is by no means settled. Scientists continue to debate the value of a code and governments are considering whether they want an international protocol or if it should be handled individually by nations.
Beyond that is making sure the guidelines would be adhered to where they matter - in the laboratory.
"I think there are going to be codes. I'm not sure that the scientists are going to be aware of them," Gigi Kwik Gronvall, an associate with the University of Pittsburgh Center for Biosecurity, said Saturday during the 2006 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Research on dangerous pathogens that once might not have faced significant scrutiny now raises red flags for the scientific community and the media in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks and the subsequent anthrax mailings. Much attention has been paid in recent years to several projects, including a 2002 paper on recreating the polio virus and a 2005 article on contaminating milk with botulinum.
The scientific community has responded with several proposals to concerns that its work could assist state or terrorist biological weapons efforts. A U.S. National Academy of Sciences committee in 2003 recommended a nationwide screening system for potentially sensitive biological research (see GSN. Oct. 8, 2003). Editors at major scientific journals that year also called for restraint in publishing articles that might aid would-be bioterrorists (see GSN, Feb. 19, 2003).
Codes of conduct are needed "to prevent the life sciences from becoming the death sciences through bioterrorism or biowarfare," said Ronald Atlas, co-director of the Center for Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism at the University of Louisville in Kentucky.
"We need to embrace the development of codes. What we really need to do is create a culture of responsibility," Atlas said Saturday during a panel discussion at the conference.
Atlas and Margaret Somerville, a professor of law and medicine at McGill University in Montreal, developed a prototype code that calls on scientists to "work to ensure that their discoveries and knowledge first do no harm." That means complying with the Biological Weapons Convention and avoiding any research that is clearly intended or is highly likely to facilitate use of biological weapons.
The nine-point plan also calls for safety and ethics reviews of research and encourages scientists to call public attention to research that could be related to biological weapons.
Consideration of codes is occurring within governments and organizations around the world, panel speakers said. The International Red Cross in 2004 issued its own set of principles for the life sciences (see GSN, Nov. 12, 2004). The InterAcademy Panel on International Issues last year issued a statement of principles - endorsed by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and dozens of other state scientific academies - that should be considered when preparing ethics policies.
"I would imagine all of these groups are hoping to influence the broader life sciences community," panel speaker Mark Nance, a member of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, said in an interview.
The board was established in 2004 to prepare strategies for oversight of federally funded or operated dual-use research that could be used against the country. One of its five working groups is developing a code of conduct that could be taken up by U.S. research institutions, said Nance, a senior counsel at GE Healthcare Biosciences.
The group is seeking input from life science professionals, and next month plans to conduct focus groups to obtain feedback on concepts that could be used in a code.
Group members have not published a schedule for completion of their work - which will rely on the results of another group developing a definition of dual-use research - and Nance said it was premature to discuss how the document might be implemented.
He said the group is monitoring similar international and domestic efforts for ideas that could strengthen its work.
In December, Biological Weapons Convention states approved a report encouraging scientists to develop ethics codes (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2005). An earlier version of the text had called on governments to promote such guidelines.
Atlas said he does not expect the nations at the treaty review conference beginning in November to approve an actual code of conduct that BWC members could use. China and other nations prefer to see the matter handled by each nation. More likely is that the members would approve a statement of support for codes, he said.
Critics say codes would restrict scientists' work while doing little to prevent an actual act of bioterrorism. They argue that their work is inherently neutral, while "bad guys are going to do bad things [and] you can't stop them," Atlas said.
Panel members acknowledged that codes would not prevent terrorists from carrying out biological attacks, but said they could raise awareness on sound practices to keep their research from supporting such an act.
They stressed that codes should allow for the greatest possible freedom for research and publication. Actual restrictions should only come into play if there is a "clear and imminent danger" that a project could promote bioterrorism, Atlas said.
Any code must avoid instituting a "top-down" framework, meaning allowing the government to decide what work can or cannot be done, Gronvall said. It is impossible to clearly define what constitutes dangerous research, and the biosciences are too widespread globally, diverse and fragmented to be controlled.
It is up to the research institutions and the scientists themselves to ensure they followed any codes, panel speakers said. Scientists are best positioned to see and address a potential risk, Gronvall said.
That strategy entails additional responsibility. Gronvall said scientists must be aware that work that does not appear related to weaponizable pathogens - for example, an aerosolized measles vaccine - could aid weapons programs. Professors must ensure their students are familiar with the Biological Weapons Convention and the obligations established by a code.
Failure to recognize the power of their work could have serious repercussions for science, Gronvall said. An act of terrorism that is linked to a study could lead to governmental restrictions on research that could undermine efforts to stem a health crisis such as SARS, she said.
Ethical violations could also hurt the scientists themselves. The American Society for Microbiology code details a review process that could lead to expulsion of members found to have violated the policy. Scientists seen as violating codes could find it difficult to work within the research community, Gronvall said.
She said in an interview that codes should be one part of an awareness campaign that includes discussion and development of more concrete biosafety policies.
Biosecurity can be taught in scientific training alongside biosafety rules such as wearing gloves and goggles, Gretchen Lorenzi, an analyst with the FBI WMD Countermeasures Unit, said during the panel discussion.
When collaborating or sharing research, asking a few questions will help scientists "sleep at night easily," Lorenzi said. Do you know where the information is going? Has the recipient been published in a related field? Was the person referred by someone known to you?
"The most valuable contribution to biosecurity is actually awareness," Lorenzi said.
