Scientists Fear Increase in Biodefense Research Increases Likelihood of Attacks or Accidents
Global Security Newswire
Some scientists are concerned that the increase in the number of researchers working in the United States to counter bioterrorism increases the risk of an attack and the accidental release of a bioagent, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported last month (see GSN, June 14).
More than 300 institutions and 12,000 individuals have access to weaponizable biological agents, said Richard Ebright, a Rutgers University molecular biologist and critic of the expansion in biodefense since the anthrax attacks of 2001. Biodefense watchdog the Sunshine Project claims that 97 percent of principal investigators who received grants from the U.S. National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases from 2001 to 2005 to study six biological agents had not previously conducted similar work. The explosion of "NIAID newbies" increases the likelihood of accidents, said Edward Hammond, U.S. director for the Sunshine Project.
Martin Hugh-Jones, an anthrax researcher at Louisiana State University, told the Baltimore Sun last year that before 2001 researchers "knew each other by name. [Now] I see a lot of names I've never heard of. . On a probabilistic basis, there's more of a risk of accidents or attacks."
Mishaps have happened, according to the Bulletin. In February, a researcher at Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Montana was exposed to the bacterium for Q fever, a pathogen that causes flu-like symptoms. The National Institute called the Rocky Mountain incident a "small spill."
Sunshine's Hammond said the Rocky Mountain incident and last year's tularemia exposures at Boston University (see GSN, May 11) are "indicative of what's to come." Rutgers' Ebright agreed, blaming the accidents on the "influx of large numbers of institutions and individuals with no prior experience into bioweapons agents research."
NIAID officials counter that, despite their inexperience, researchers are qualified to deal with bioweapons. Scientists "can't learn about anthrax by studying E. coli. It is important that people work on these [bioweapon] organisms," said senior NIAID program officer Rona Hirschberg.
Jeanne Guillemin, a senior fellow at the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is not convinced, the Bulletin reported. Increasing access to pathogens heightens the chances that rogue scientists could use them in an attack. "What [NIAID Director Anthony Fauci] and others haven't thought through is the particular kind of expertise, from basic bench work to erosolization, that comes with defensive biological weapons programs," she said (Nick Schwellenbach, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005).
Some scientists are concerned that the increase in the number of researchers working in the United States to counter bioterrorism increases the risk of an attack and the accidental release of a bioagent, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported last month (see GSN, June 14).
More than 300 institutions and 12,000 individuals have access to weaponizable biological agents, said Richard Ebright, a Rutgers University molecular biologist and critic of the expansion in biodefense since the anthrax attacks of 2001. Biodefense watchdog the Sunshine Project claims that 97 percent of principal investigators who received grants from the U.S. National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases from 2001 to 2005 to study six biological agents had not previously conducted similar work. The explosion of "NIAID newbies" increases the likelihood of accidents, said Edward Hammond, U.S. director for the Sunshine Project.
Martin Hugh-Jones, an anthrax researcher at Louisiana State University, told the Baltimore Sun last year that before 2001 researchers "knew each other by name. [Now] I see a lot of names I've never heard of. . On a probabilistic basis, there's more of a risk of accidents or attacks."
Mishaps have happened, according to the Bulletin. In February, a researcher at Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Montana was exposed to the bacterium for Q fever, a pathogen that causes flu-like symptoms. The National Institute called the Rocky Mountain incident a "small spill."
Sunshine's Hammond said the Rocky Mountain incident and last year's tularemia exposures at Boston University (see GSN, May 11) are "indicative of what's to come." Rutgers' Ebright agreed, blaming the accidents on the "influx of large numbers of institutions and individuals with no prior experience into bioweapons agents research."
NIAID officials counter that, despite their inexperience, researchers are qualified to deal with bioweapons. Scientists "can't learn about anthrax by studying E. coli. It is important that people work on these [bioweapon] organisms," said senior NIAID program officer Rona Hirschberg.
Jeanne Guillemin, a senior fellow at the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is not convinced, the Bulletin reported. Increasing access to pathogens heightens the chances that rogue scientists could use them in an attack. "What [NIAID Director Anthony Fauci] and others haven't thought through is the particular kind of expertise, from basic bench work to erosolization, that comes with defensive biological weapons programs," she said (Nick Schwellenbach, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005).
